This book taps the best American thinkers to answer the essential American question: How do we sustain our experiment in government of, by, and for the people? Authored by an extraordinary and politically diverse roster of public officials, scholars, and educators, these chapters describe our nation's civic education problem, assess its causes, offer an agenda for reform, and explain the high stakes at risk if we fail.

As I sat down to sketch this review of Richard Kearney’s new book on touch, I happened to have received just then in the post a record I had ordered some time ago. It was an album by the French gro...

This article considers the Undercover Surrealism exhibition curated at London’s Hayward Gallery and reflects on the practices of documentation, archiving and exhibition when the topic of the exhibition, as in this case, is a journal that in its most radical intention was set up to critique the practices of exhibition and documentation. The short and controversial life of Georges Bataille’s Documents unfolds as an often deliberately confusing juxtaposition of images and articles. The exhibition aims to represent both the sometimes incompatible (...) interests of the journal’s collaborators and the public dispute between Bataille and Breton over the aims of Surrealism. The article explores the intentions, risks, and possible effects of the exhibition in the context of Bataille’s own philosophy and his own peculiar part in the publication of Documents, which in its time was a contemporary review of diverse cultural phenomena interspersed with subversive dictionary entries. The article thus raises the question of what happens to the subversive intentions of a project like Documents in the scholarly historicist environment of public exhibition space. (shrink)

Set theory is a branch of mathematics with a special subject matter, the infinite, but also a general framework for all modern mathematics, whose notions figure in every branch, pure and applied. This Element will offer a concise introduction, treating the origins of the subject, the basic notion of set, the axioms of set theory and immediate consequences, the set-theoretic reconstruction of mathematics, and the theory of the infinite, touching also on selected topics from higher set theory, controversial axioms and (...) undecided questions, and philosophical issues raised by technical developments. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:522 BOOK REVIEWS The Reason of Following: Christology and the Ecstatic I. By ROBERT P. ScHARLEMANN. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992. Pp. 214. $32.50 (cloth). Robert P. Scharlemann is Commonwealth Professor of Religious Studies at the University of Virginia. Writing in the tradition of Bultmann 's observation that speaking of God requires speaking of oneself, he conceives of christology as a distinctive form of reason, a philosophical /theological (...) anthropology in which the logic of discipleship occupies a prominent place. Accordingly, The Reason of Following is a sustained pursuit of " an articulated understanding of the nature and constitution of human being" (p. 1), a theme which Scharlemann sees as a component of christology which has wrongly been eclipsed by other dimensions in more traditional presentations. The goal of Scharlemann's work is to bring into view " the nature of the relation that is implied when it is reported, for example, that Jesus said' Follow me! ' and there were those who 'immediately' followed.... What is the nature of the ' following ' on the part of those who will ' immediately ' follow the summons of one whose name is ' I am '? And who is the ' I ' of the ' I am ' in the person who makes the summons? " (p. 88). Each of the four themes sounded in this cita· tion-the call to discipleship, the immediacy of following, the identification of Jesus as ' I am,' and the designation of the specifics of the disciples' relationship to Jesus as an example, but no more than an ex· ample, of a broader possibility of human existence-is a fundamental element in Scharlemann's conception of christology. Operating on the principle that the traditional definition of a human being as a rational animal can be replaced by the existential definition " ' I ' am here " (cf. p. ix), Scharlemann devotes two lengthy introductory chapters to explicating the significance of this shift from " what " a human being is to " where " and " when " it is. Dr.awing especially on Descartes, Luther, Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Fichte, his studies of the subjectivity and being of the self accent the import· ance of the I as subject and explore the differences between the I of pure actuality shown in the method of doubt, the I of pure possibility shown in the anticipation of death, and the I of pure freedom shown in the evocation of trust. Against this background, reflections on the na· ture of following envisage an additional possible I, one summoned by the call to be wholly in the world, in finite freedom. Before investigating the christological relation as " a rational form of its own" (p. viii), Scharlemann offers a preliminary analysis of modes of thinking. Distinguishing between thinking ("the openness BOOK REVIEWS 523 of the self to what is other than thinking" [p. 62]) and reason ("the configuration of this openness" [p. 62], i.e., "a definite way in which the self is related to its other through an activity " [p. 103] ), he argues that thinking always appears in one of two basic modes: understanding of being, or faith in God. These two modes-not to he confused with forms of reason-cover the entire field of thinking: " When we trust anyone at all, we are trusting God, just as, when we understand anything at all, we understand being" {p. 76). While aware that his implied definition of faith differs from those of the Christian theological tradition and is not serviceable for purposes of historical theology, Scharlemann opts nonetheless for a terminology which draws " as clearly as possible the parallel between faith and understanding as two modes of thinking whose own object is as such beyond the understanding of being and the faith in God " (p. 77). Turning to the specific form of reason which is the hook's chief concern, Scharlemann devotes a central chapter to " The Exstantial I in Christological Reason." After a critique of traditional christologies, he adumbrates a christology which seeks to depict the self of discipleship as one in which " the other to which the self relates itself is the inwardness of the self without being a projection from that inwardness " (p. 96). Appealing to the principle that the notion of the self as related to... (shrink)

This paper critiques the biological race realism of Quayshawn Spencer. Spencer's recent embrace of “radical race pluralism” (RRP) is welcome but incomplete, because it needs methods that distinguish different communicative contexts for how American English speakers use “race” and related terms. I offer a pragmatic approach to identifying such contexts that combines pragmatic argumentation theory, rhetorical polysemy, and a pragmatic approach to definition. One consequence of embracing RRP is that Spencer's theory of “OMB race talk” is unsupportable because it collapses (...) three distinct communicative contexts: genomic research, legal and regulatory governance, and ordinary talk. By so doing, OMB race talk blocks attempts to fight racism and violates ethical standards that should allow people the agency to define their own identities. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS Men Astutely Trained: A History of the Jesuits in the American Cen· tury. By PETER McDONOUGH. New York: Free Press, 1992. xxi +616 pp. $24.95. Last summer in Paris, sitting at one of the sidewalk tables that line the Boulevard S. Germain, a young Jesuit priest just finishing his doc· toral studies narrated some of the horror stories associated these days with " the joh market." Having (...) suffered through my own variation on that theme, I could only share with him the results of my own experi· ence. This novelty in the Jesuit stance provides Peter McDonough with a major theme in his narrative, for he describes the change in the So· ciety " from a rule-governed hierarchy to a role-driven network " (p. 459). He locates this transition in what he calls " the American century," roughly from 1900 to 1965. McDonough's study, an exciting and profitable read, traces the shift from Aquinas to the Age of Aquarius. Especially for an extern (i.e. a non-Jesuit), he has taken on a formidable challenge. Generally well received by the Jesuits, Men Astutely Trained tells how American Catholicism moved from an immigrant church to an upwardly mobile society. In the shifting loyalties, aggravated by the Second Vatican Council, Jesuits and their institutions felt the crunch. Since this innovation, loosely identified with " the democratization of culture," has precipitated the Society of Jesus "into the most serious crisis in its history " (p. xiv), McDonough must do a counterpoint he· tween the inner life and its external expressions. So the saga gains both breadth and depth. Without denigrating the accomplishment, at once earnest and literate, I want to take issue with the hook. As one of my colleagues taught me many years ago, we cannot stimulate discourse if everybody is con· tinually agreeing. First then, I want to comment on the flawed methodology. Next, I will say something about its thesis and conclude with a few reflections on "modernity." For Jesuits of my generation, the work of Malinowski proved normative. The anthropologist spent ten years among the natives who in· habited the Trobriand Islands in Melanesia. It apparently took that long for him to understand the stories and symbols, their myths and rituals. When he put his encyclopedia together, he could describe their institutions and social structures. In short, he worked from the inside out. McDonough, on the other hand, works from the outside in. In my 711 712 BOOK REVIEWS opinion, this represents a major failing in methodology. Two consequences flow from this deficiency. The author is never able to relate the works of the Society to the principal texts of the Society. The Spiritual Exercises, for example, does not rate even a mention. The Constitutions merits a fleeting reference on p. 160. St. Ignatius himself does not appear. Divorced as he is from the principal experience of Jesuits, our author cannot provide an adequate understanding for any of their priorities. This awareness makes his claim to present "the inside of the Society of Jesus" (p. 462) somewhat pretentious. Because he does not have the interior life in focus, many of the readings strike me as unnecessarily cluttered. He has yet to recognize the validity of John Stuart Mill's principle, "No man's synthesis can be greater than his analysis." While he has not left out three-fourths the data, perhaps he has neglected one-half. Secondly, he does not acknowledge Jesuits principally as churchmen. Instead, he makes us look like an acephalous torso. The church-con· nection reveals a major dimension to understanding the Society's coherence and institutions. It does not occur to the author that Jesuit priests are also bound to the universal discipline of the Church as found, for example, in the Codex Juris Canonici (1917). According to the Pio-Benedictine Code, all priests (and not just Jesuits) are expected to recite the breviary, to stay away from politics, and to avoid all "spectacles" including baseball games. Moreover, it is not entirely true to say that Jesuits acted independently of local bishops. Jesuits were able to establish their schools precisely because the local bishop invited them and encouraged the work. The ecclesial dimension becomes especially... (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Gods Problem The Evolution of Free Will Is Our Starting Point So Gods Evolved Gods Are Hidden Inside Us The Godless Must Walk the Earth Gods Must Be Made Manifest Religion Mediates Between Free Will and Gods Living in Harmony With Our Actual Gods.

This article criticizes the standard way philosophers pose issues about the core practices of criminal justice institutions. Attempting to get at some of the presuppositions of posing these issues in terms of punishment, I construct a revised version of Rawls's ‘telishment’ case, a revision based on actual features of contemporary criminal justice practices in the USA. In addressing the implications of ‘racialment’, as I call it, some connections are made to current philosophical discussions about race. I conclude with brief remarks (...) about the importance of race to philosophical discussion as such. (shrink)

In this paper Sullins argues that in certain circumstances robots can be seen as real moral agents. A distinction is made between persons and moral agents such that, it is not necessary for a robot to have personhood in order to be a moral agent. I detail three requirements for a robot to be seen as a moral agent. The first is achieved when the robot is significantly autonomous from any programmers or operators of the machine. The second is when (...) one can analyze or explain the robot's behavior only by ascribing to it some predisposition or 'intention' to do good or harm. And finally, robot moral agency requires the robot to behave in a way that shows and understanding of responsibility to some other moral agent. Robots with all of these criteria will have moral rights as well as responsibilities regardless of their status as persons. (shrink)

Numbers and other mathematical objects are exceptional in having no locations in space or time or relations of cause and effect. This makes it difficult to account for the possibility of the knowledge of such objects, leading many philosophers to embrace nominalism, the doctrine that there are no such objects, and to embark on ambitious projects for interpreting mathematics so as to preserve the subject while eliminating its objects. This book cuts through a host of technicalities that have obscured previous (...) discussions of these projects, and presents clear, concise accounts of a dozen strategies for nominalistic interpretation of mathematics, thus equipping the reader to evaluate each and to compare different ones. The authors also offer critical discussion, rare in the literature, of the aims and claims of nominalistic interpretation, suggesting that it is significant in a very different way from that usually assumed. (shrink)

While we are commonly told that the distinctive method of mathematics is rigorous proof, and that the special topic of mathematics is abstract structure, there has been no agreement among mathematicians, logicians, or philosophers as to just what either of these assertions means. John P. Burgess clarifies the nature of mathematical rigor and of mathematical structure, and above all of the relation between the two, taking into account some of the latest developments in mathematics, including the rise of experimental (...) mathematics on the one hand and computerized formal proofs on the other hand. Along the way, a great many historical developments in mathematics, philosophy, and logic are surveyed. Yet very little in the way of background knowledge on the part of the reader is presupposed. (shrink)

The source, status, and significance of the derivation of the necessity of identity at the beginning of Kripke’s lecture “Identity and Necessity” is discussed from a logical, philosophical, and historical point of view.

This book surveys the assortment of methods put forth for fixing Frege's system, in an attempt to determine just how much of mathematics can be reconstructed in ...

Two strategies used to uncover neural systems for episodic-like memory in animals are discussed: (i) an attribute of episodic memory (what? when? where?) is examined in order to reveal the neuronal interactions supporting that component of memory; and (ii) the connections of a structure thought to be central to episodic memory in humans are studied at a level of detail not feasible in humans. By focusing on spatial memory (where?) and the hippocampus, it has proved possible to bring the strategies (...) together. A review of lesion, disconnection and immediate early-gene studies in animals reveals the importance of interactions between the hippocampus and specific nuclei in the diencephalon (most notably the anterior thalamic nuclei) for spatial memory. Other parts of this extended hippocampal system include the mammillary bodies and the posterior cingulate (retrosplenial) cortex. Furthermore, by combining lesion and immediate early-gene studies it is possible to show how the loss of one component structure or tract can influence the remaining regions in this group of structures. The validity of this convergent approach is supported by new findings showing that the same set of regions is implicated in anterograde amnesia in humans. (shrink)

Introduction A brief look at the competing present-day interpretations of Hume's philosophy will leave the uninitiated reader completely baffled. On the one hand , Hume is seen as a philosopher who attempted to analyse concepts with ...

The great logician Gottlob Frege attempted to provide a purely logical foundation for mathematics. His system collapsed when Bertrand Russell discovered a contradiction in it. Thereafter, mathematicians and logicians, beginning with Russell himself, turned in other directions to look for a framework for modern abstract mathematics. Over the past couple of decades, however, logicians and philosophers have discovered that much more is salvageable from the rubble of Frege's system than had previously been assumed. A variety of repaired systems have been (...) proposed, each a consistent theory permitting the development of a significant portion of mathematics. This book surveys the assortment of methods put forth for fixing Frege's system, in an attempt to determine just how much of mathematics can be reconstructed in each. John Burgess considers every proposed fix, each with its distinctive philosophical advantages and drawbacks. These systems range from those barely able to reconstruct the rudiments of arithmetic to those that go well beyond the generally accepted axioms of set theory into the speculative realm of large cardinals. For the most part, Burgess finds that attempts to fix Frege do less than advertised to revive his system. This book will be the benchmark against which future analyses of the revival of Frege will be measured. (shrink)

The most important distinctively American contribution to philosophy is the pragmatist tradition. In this short, lucid, and completely convincing exposition, Professor John P. Murphy begins by exploring the roots of this tradition as found in the work of Peirce, James, and Dewey, demonstrating its power and originality. Historians of philosophy will appreciate the insight Murphy brings to these figures, but the special value of this book lies in his discussion of how the pragmatist spirit has flowered in contemporary philosophy (...) in the work of Quine, Rorty, and Davidson.Throughout, Murphy emphasizes the logic and structure of the views held by these six philosophers and what it is they have in common that makes their work especially “pragmatist.” There is no better introduction to this historical tradition and perhaps no better way into the philosophies of the contemporaries whom Murphy discusses.Interest in pragmatist ideas is undergoing a revival at present, and this book shows us why. It will be of interest to both historians of philosophy and students of contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

Highlighting previously neglected democratic strains in Machiavelli's major writings, McCormick excavates institutions through which the common people of ancient, medieval, and Renaissance republics constrained the power of wealthy citizens and public magistrates, and he imagines how such institutions might be revived today.

Darwinism, Democracy, and Race examines the development and defence of an argument that arose at the boundary between anthropology and evolutionary biology in twentieth-century America. In its fully articulated form, this argument simultaneously discredited scientific racism and defended free human agency in Darwinian terms. The volume is timely because it gives readers a key to assessing contemporary debates about the biology of race. By working across disciplinary lines, the book's focal figures--the anthropologist Franz Boas, the cultural anthropologist Alfred Kroeber, the (...) geneticist Theodosius Dobzhansky, and the physical anthropologist Sherwood Washburn--found increasingly persuasive ways of cutting between genetic determinist and social constructionist views of race by grounding Boas's racially egalitarian, culturally relativistic, and democratically pluralistic ethic in a distinctive version of the genetic theory of natural selection. Collaborators in making and defending this argument included Ashley Montagu, Stephen Jay Gould, and Richard Lewontin. Darwinism, Democracy, and Race will appeal to advanced undergraduates, graduate students, and academics interested in subjects including Philosophy, Critical Race Theory, Sociology of Race, History of Biology and Anthropology, and Rhetoric of Science. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:John P. Anton C. P. CAVAFY'S ARS POETICA ' It is generally recognized that Constantine P. Cavafy (1863-1933) was not born a poet but became one only through persistence and labor, reaching his "first step" sometime after the midpoint of his life. In his effort to assess the quality of his earlier poetic production and sharpen his sensitivity in facing self-criticism, he decided to put in writing his (...) personal thoughts on his work sometime in 1903. The text was written in English in a personal shorthand Cavafy had devised for his own use. It was found among the papers he left to A. Sengopoulos and published for the first time in 1963 by M. Peridis, who also supplied the suitable title Ars Poetica. It falls outside the scope of this essay to discuss the antecedents of this document. Taken as a whole, the text has all the clarity and directness required of a testament designed to serve as a personal guide and handbook. The problems it discusses are limited to the needs of the poet. In this regard, the Ars Poetica has neither the range of topics nor the theoretical scope of, for instance, Aristotle's Poetics. It is quite certain that the ideas that preoccupy Cavafy in the Ars Poetica had been on his mind for a period of years. However, the Ars Poetica is his first prose piece where he gives a systematic treatment to technical and critical issues directly related to the assessment of his work and his role as a poet. In order to project here a clear image of Cavafy's struggle to reach his technical maturity which came after 1910, we need first to discuss the persistent problems he faced during this crucial decade, then to examine the attitudes and values he embodied in certain representative early poems, and finally to relate them to the guiding principles he formulated in his self-addressed poetics of 1903. A number of interrelated problems confronted Cavafy in his late twenties and throughout his thirties. They emerged one by one, to 85 86Philosophy and Literature make more pressing the demand for a consistent solution and a complete recasting of his outlook. Coming to terms with them was extremely difficult. Aside from the emotional and sexual pressures he had to face alone, there was the absence of suitable ideas and conceptual tools to provide him with even the rudiments of an intellectual framework. Whatever he borrowed from Europe and England, or resurrected from his own Hellenic heritage, proved either beyond assimilation or insufficiently digested. The lingering issues fell roughly into four areas. (i) Despite his determination to devote his life to the writing of poetry, the quality of his work was discouraging. He knew this and as a result he often expressed uncertainty about his ability to proceed. Time and again he appeared suffering from a feeling of inadequacy, but nevertheless he sought to engage a reflective mood from which to draw encouragement and hope. (ii) On the theoretical side, he identified with the long tradition which assigned a coveted cultural role to the savant-poet as discloser of truth and spokesman for humanity; this despite the prevailing climate of opinion in his immediate environment which recognized no such high position in his case. Cavafy knew that his standing with the Greek community of Alexandria had gradually dwindled with the loss of family wealth and his lowly employment, and also that his expectations to be respected in his role as a poet and leader in communal affairs were futile. This denial of personal recognition in a society dominated by commerce and finance contributed to his mood of depression. The feeling of being an outcast, despite his associations with the upper social circles of Alexandria, became a constant irritant to his sense of pride. (iii) The course of culture, the destiny of human institutions and the workings of history, became puzzles as he tried to view them through the opaque glass of disillusionment. These were the grand themes actively discussed in the writings of leading European intellectuals, but to the young poet they had a different personal urgency. His vital concern in this connection was not understanding science... (shrink)

Used as the basis of the program at the Equinox Holistic Alternative School in Toronto, The Holistic Curriculum advocates for an integrative approach to teaching and learning with a focus on developing a deep connection between mind and body.

Philosophical Logic is a clear and concise critical survey of nonclassical logics of philosophical interest written by one of the world's leading authorities on the subject. After giving an overview of classical logic, John Burgess introduces five central branches of nonclassical logic, focusing on the sometimes problematic relationship between formal apparatus and intuitive motivation. Requiring minimal background and arranged to make the more technical material optional, the book offers a choice between an overview and in-depth study, and it balances (...) the philosophical and technical aspects of the subject.The book emphasizes the relationship between models and the traditional goal of logic, the evaluation of arguments, and critically examines apparatus and assumptions that often are taken for granted. Philosophical Logic provides an unusually thorough treatment of conditional logic, unifying probabilistic and model-theoretic approaches. It underscores the variety of approaches that have been taken to relevantistic and related logics, and it stresses the problem of connecting formal systems to the motivating ideas behind intuitionistic mathematics. Each chapter ends with a brief guide to further reading.Philosophical Logic addresses students new to logic, philosophers working in other areas, and specialists in logic, providing both a sophisticated introduction and a new synthesis. (shrink)

The debate over whether brain death is death has focused on whether individuals who have sustained total brain failure have satisfied the biological definition of death as “the irreversible loss of the integration of the organism as a whole.” In this paper, I argue that what it means for an organism to be integrated “as a whole” is undefined and vague in the views of those who attempt to define death as the irreversible loss of the integration of the organism (...) as a whole. I show how what it means for a living thing to be integrated as a whole depends on the sortal concept by which it is identified. Since interests, values, and ontological considerations besides strictly biological ones affect the concepts by which we individuate and identify living things, those non-biological considerations have a bearing on what it means for a particular kind of living thing to exist as a whole and thus what it means for one of us to die. Even if our bodies may remain organically integrated in some sense despite total brain failure, this fact should not lead us to reject brain death as death. Artificially sustained brain-dead human bodies are not human beings, but the remains of them. While such bodies may be alive in some sense, they are not human beings or human persons. They are not one of us. (shrink)

What is the moral status of humans lacking the potential for consciousness? The concept of potentiality often tips the scales in life-and-death medical decisions. Some argue that all human embryos have the potential to develop characteristics—such as consciousness, intellect, and will—that we normally associate with personhood. Individuals with total brain failure or in a persistent vegetative state are thought to lack the potential for consciousness or any other mental function. Or do they? In Potentiality John Lizza gathers classic articles (...) alongside newly commissioned chapters from leading thinkers who analyze the nature of potentiality in bioethics, a concept central to a number of important debates. The contributors illustrate how considerations of potentiality and potential persons complicate the analysis of the moral consideration of persons at the beginning and end of life. A number of works explicitly uncover the Aristotelian background of the concept, while others explore philosophical issues about persons, dispositions, and possibility. The common assumption that potentiality is intrinsic to whatever has the potentiality is challenged by a relational view of persons, an extrinsic account of dispositions, and attention to how extrinsic factors affect realistic possibilities. Although potentiality has figured prominently in bioethical literature, it has not received a great deal of logical, semantic, and metaphysical analysis in contemporary philosophical literature. This collection will bring these thorny philosophical issues to the fore. Incorporating cutting-edge research on the topic of potentiality, this thought-provoking collection will interest bioethicists, philosophers, health care professionals, attorneys engaged in medical and health issues, and hospital and governmental committees who advise on policy and law concerning issues at the beginning and end of life. (shrink)

John Norton says that philosophers have been led astray for thousands of years by their attempt to treat induction formally. He is correct that such an attempt has caused no end of trouble, but he is wrong about the history. There is a rich tradition of non-formal induction. In fact, material theories of induction prevailed all through antiquity and from the Renaissance to the mid-1800s. Recovering these past systems would not only fill lacunae in Norton’s own theory but would (...) highlight areas where Norton has not freed himself from the straightjacket of formal induction as much as he might think. This essay begins that recovery. (shrink)

There are schools of logicians who claim that an argument is not valid unless the conclusion is relevant to the premises. In particular, relevance logicians reject the classical theses that anything follows from a contradiction and that a logical truth follows from everything. This chapter critically evaluates several different motivations for relevance logic, and several systems of relevance logic, finding them all wanting.

This book will appeal to mathematicians and philosophers interested in the foundations of mathematics.

This volume reprints a dozen of the author’s papers, most with substantial postscripts, and adds one new one. The bulk of the material is on topics in philosophy of language, but there are also two papers on philosophy of mathematics written after the appearance of the author’s collected papers on that subject, and one on epistemology. As to the substance of Field’s contributions, limitations of space preclude doing much more below than indicating the range of issues addressed, and the general (...) orientation taken towards them. As to the style of his writing, it well exhibits the first of the two virtues, clarity and conciseness, that one looks for in philosophical prose. (shrink)

By utilizing new information from both clinical and experimental (lesion, electrophysiological, and gene-activation) studies with animals, the anatomy underlying anterograde amnesia has been reformulated. The distinction between temporal lobe and diencephalic amnesia is of limited value in that a common feature of anterograde amnesia is damage to part of an comprising the hippocampus, the fornix, the mamillary bodies, and the anterior thalamic nuclei. This view, which can be traced back to Delay and Brion (1969), differs from other recent models in (...) placing critical importance on the efferents from the hippocampus via the fornix to the diencephalon. These are necessary for the encoding and, hence, the effective subsequent recall of episodic memory. An additional feature of this hippocampalanterior thalamic and the perirhinal–medial dorsal thalamic systems are compromised, leading to severe deficits in both recall and recognition. (shrink)

A new axiomatization of set theory, to be called Bernays-Boolos set theory, is introduced. Its background logic is the plural logic of Boolos, and its only positive set-theoretic existence axiom is a reflection principle of Bernays. It is a very simple system of axioms sufficient to obtain the usual axioms of ZFC, plus some large cardinals, and to reduce every question of plural logic to a question of set theory.

The complexity of the set of truths of arithmetic is determined for various theories of truth deriving from Kripke and from Gupta and Herzberger.

The form of nominalism known as 'mathematical fictionalism' is examined and found wanting, mainly on grounds that go back to an early antinominalist work of Rudolf Carnap that has unfortunately not been paid sufficient attention by more recent writers.